

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #8731-83
5 December 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM

:

Assistant NIO for General Purpose Forces

SUBJECT

:

Comments on Your "Rampant Violence" Memo, NIC #8640-83,
Dated 30 November 83

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1. I was shocked by your insightful piece on global violence because I had failed to link orchestration of this cacophony to Moscow. After reading and mulling over your paper it suddenly occurred that my old Masters thesis written in 1969 on Soviet foreign policy, the conclusion of which is attached, echoed the same theme. I am also attaching an article from The Washington Post's Outlook section, December 4, 1983, that speaks to this subject. Should the ruling clique decide that internal pressure had exceeded safety limits and more forays into foreign regions were expedient, despite the danger of superpower confrontation, the future of the entire world could well be held in the balance. A decrepit, bankrupt and tottering oligarchy is still much to be feared in the nuclear age. You may indeed be right that the US is winning the battle; I am fearful that in the war we may all be losers.

2. You can easily see that your thesis struck a nerve. We are in agreement on causes and effects but our conclusions may be different. I find myself much less sanguine about our inevitable success in the race with the Soviet Union because I am still fearful of the consequences of this military giant who can claim only one success story--military might. The US must be vigilant (intelligence) and strong (deterrence), but I feel we must "compel" them to reduce armaments by the weight of our strength, determination and logic. Much of military power is perception, equal arms reduction should therefore be perceived as stabilizing. With reduced arsenals the USSR might feel less inclined to use force to preserve its own fragile legitimacy or defuse internal frustration. However, in the long run I wonder how long either superpower can continue to pour its wealth into the bottomless pit of weaponry.

3. We need more long range and deep thinking on this subject. I see no recourse at present than to continue spending on arms to match our resolve with theirs but this cannot persist for generations. You are entirely correct that the USSR has failed its people by attaching its star to a bankrupt ideology. At the present rate the Soviet Socialist State will never achieve communism which Lenin predicted in due course. (Is 60 years due course?)

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4. This subject would make a wonderful seminar within the Intelligence Community along with invited political, military and academic participation. Is there such a vehicle for sharing in existence? As new boy on the block I am unaware of a CIA forum for such an undertaking but, subject to approval and workload, I would enjoy continuing this discussion and working to expose your thesis to a wider audience.

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Attachments:
As stated

increased rather than abated. For Moscow and her willing accomplices the experiment raised possibilities which would have nullified all the bitter, hard-won gains of World War II and subsequent cold war.

Djilas, Przezinski, Morgenthau, and others viewed the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia as merely their latest manifestation of aggressiveness.⁸ In addition, it was inconceivable that any country in the Soviet orbit could resume to enjoy freedoms denied to the people of the U.S.S.R.⁹ There is considerable evidence that the Soviets have enough internal dissension without compounding the issue with envy or possible emulation of the satellite countries. Morgenthau claims that the use of military might to crush the Czechoslovak

Weak experiment was determined by the recklessness of the political system which pawned it. The Soviet Union has discredited its ideological foundation and hence the legitimacy of communism as a political movement and as a prime mover behind the government. It is just another state, but one capable of enacting its will upon its neighbors in pursuit of vital interests and self-interest. Hungary was a single act of defiance, Czechoslovakia conjured up the spectre of slow erosion which, given

The weakness of communist legitimacy everywhere could spread throughout the communist world, destroying the monopoly of political power of the Soviet Communist Party itself.¹⁰ In early warnings to the Czechoslovak government, Soviet news media repeated the familiar dictum, "There can be only one kind of socialism and that is Soviet

democracy,¹¹ which is the supreme form of
sovereignty.¹²

There are those who view the Soviet
Union as posing no more threat to the
West than it did prior to intervention.¹³
The Soviets are neither more aggressive
nor more pacific; they simply want to
retain the empire it took so long to
build.¹⁴ The West must therefore
act to defend its own interests.¹⁵

posture of Soviet military might with
greater alarm. Senators Henry Jackson
and Frank Moss have called attention to
the imbalance of power created by the
Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia.¹³
“The Soviet Union is a dangerous and
unpredictable adversary. We cannot be
confident that a Soviet Union . . . will
not use military force in pursuing its
objectives in other situations, when it
believes this can be done without in-
curring unacceptable risks.” Senator
Jackson warned Congress after the in-
vasion. Both Senators have been staunch
advocates of renewed N.V.O. awareness
and strengthening to offset the increas-
ing aggressive posture of Soviet forces in
Europe.¹⁴ My own position is some-
where between these two extremes.

Implications. The New threat posed by Moscow is not one of immediate aggression against NATO or the United States; it is one of a Great Power becoming overly reliant upon the use of armed might to crush disagreement at home and abroad. Having twice thwarted movements inimical to her supposed vital interests, the U.S.S.R. may, in the future, not hesitate to employ force again. Wherein lies the real threat. The use of her huge land army and her growing naval presence as a substitute for diplomacy must, in time, lead to confrontation with NATO and the United States whether it be over Yugoslavia, the Middle East, or elsewhere. The comparative success and ease in which the military aspects of the interventions were accomplished are certainly not deterring factors for the future utilization of the armed forces in

The Brezhnev doctrine implies the continued resort to force to achieve the aims of foreign policy. Moscow's right to intervene at its discretion places Yugoslavia and Romania in extremely anomalous positions. It can rely on no outside assistance; there is no treaty

Soviet attempts to achieve a foothold in the Adriatic area by force, however, might easily escalate to a tragic confrontation with NATO and the United States. For Rumania, those committed to its defense paradoxically, are the likely aggressors. Outside assistance, under any circumstance, is remote. Ceausescu can be little consoled by the defense provisions of the Warsaw Pact, especially by the last two instances of its use--against two signatories, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet ruling clique has, throughout its 50-year history, been harsh in its dealings with minority dissatisfaction, from the dispersal of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly in 1918 to the interventions in the neighbouring allied states of Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

In the final analysis of these acts it has shown a disregard for moral and judicial condemnations. For the Soviets, the maintenance of the status quo ante and spheres of influence are absolute prerequisites for national security and outweigh world opinion and judgments. It is not surprising, with only a hasty perusal of Soviet history, to find the military solution basic in the pursuit of national interests. The traditional buffer states of Eastern Europe were preserved for communism by armed forces occupation. The surprising aspect of the Czechoslovak intervention, as compared to Hungary, was the manner in which it

was accomplished. Western observers and, indeed, the Dubcek regime itself knew full well the capabilities of the Soviet troops massed along the Czechoslovak borders long in advance of the actual invasion. As early as the March conference between Dubcek and the frightened five — Ulbricht, Gomulka, Zhivkov, Kadar, and Brezhnev the threat of Warsaw Pact forces entering Czechoslovakia was a fresh reality. The Soviets tightened the military noose slowly. In April they canceled the previously scheduled staff conference of Czechoslovakian and Soviet

exercise on the Czechoslovak, and in June they entered the country. Pact troops lingered through July, finally moving to preplanned positions on the Czechoslovak periphery to maintain constant pressure. There was no such element of time during the Hungarian crisis. Troops had to be rushed into Hungary to prevent communism's demise. Elaborate exercises along the Czechoslovak frontiers and a massive callup of reserves for an announced logistics exercise within the U.S.S.R.

western border districts provided ample time to apply pressure and eventual employ these forces to halt the contagion of liberalization. But the entire world believed that the crisis had been resolved by the accords of Cierny and Bratislava.

Is it possible then that Soviet action can no longer be predicted as Senator Jackson has stated? Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia after the usual diplomatic procedure of negotiation at compromise agreements. What does this future hold for a world in a therm nuclear environment if one of the greatest powers appears no longer to act rationally and predictably? International relations and peace itself are predicated upon the reasoned approach of diplomacy and negotiation.

The Soviet hierarchy seems present to be more capricious than

A black and white portrait photograph of Mr. H.J. Tessendorf. He is a middle-aged man with dark, wavy hair and a well-groomed mustache. He is dressed in a dark suit jacket over a white shirt and a dark tie. The background is plain and light-colored.



BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY

former regimes. In the international arena the actions and words of a Stalin could be studied and probes made based on analyses of intentions. Instead of the anticipated mellowing of communism and the erosion of despotism presaged by Ambassador George F. Kennan, a certain hardening and rigidity permeate the new leading elite. Theories of convergence—that communism and capitalism were on a course bringing them inevitably together—and the softening of communism were dealt a harsh blow by the events of August 1968.¹⁵ Many other dubiously hopeful cliches of the day have been since discarded. The peculiar charm of the boisterous, flamboyant, country bumpkin, Nikita Khrushchev, had made analysis of the leadership's true bent difficult. His attack on Stalin deluded many into accepting Kennan's predictions. Today's Kremlin troika, however, appears to be following a path diametrically opposed to conservatism and caution.¹⁶

The Hungarian episode can be understood from the Soviet point of view as a necessary though regrettable intervention. The Soviet Union had been provoked and abandoned by an ally in the short space of 10 days. Czechoslovakia, however, was a blatant, raw use of violence to smash an internal disagreement after a negotiated accord had apparently satisfied all parties. This is the crux of the matter: reliance on the use of force to achieve the goals of foreign policy—especially if that force has twice been used in the past twelve years against fraternal neighbors and allies—bodes ill for the future. Soviet foreign policy can no longer be characterized as a cautious but may well be termed adventurous some.

The Soviet state is beset by enormous difficulties internally which

lead to increase the need for a program adventure to relieve tensions and the ease of tensions in the Middle East. For the United States it may be well to realize that technology, trade,

and youth are not the panacea for detente between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The examples of Hungary and Czechoslovakia are vivid proofs that coercive a dissenter or maintain one's own libertarian aspirations can result in harsh Stalinist repression and not softening, mellowing, or the erosion of despotism. The resurgence of police power, a dictatorship of the militariat, a new Stalin can just as easily emerge in a Communist and within are nationalistic stirrings which must be suppressed by the presence of Soviet armed forces or the Internal Security Troops (MIOOP) and KGB. Stalin's harsh rule, devoid of mass terror and paranoic extremes, must remain more than a memory; it must be constant and ubiquitous, though somewhat tempered by time.

Those writers of William Glaser's third school of Soviet foreign policy analysis—Beloff, Brezinski, Mergenthaler, Djilas, Shub—appear to me to have presented the most useful interpretation of Soviet foreign policy. It is perhaps not too presumptuous to state that Prezhnyov, Kosygin, and Podgorny may be characterized in ability, leadership, and charisma as mediocre at best. The leadership has suffered the erosion of its revolutionary fervor and ideology almost to the point of equality with traditional Russian, xenophobic rulers. World communism stands in ill repute; its allure has been tainted by rift, revisionism, and factionalism. The preservation of the status quo seems to be the preoccupation of this ruling generation of politicians. New concepts have been largely discredited as counter-revolutionary, leaving a stagnated mentality to lead the international Communist movement and Soviet state.


The free world must be wary of this unpredictable adversary. Soviet diplomacy of the summer of 1968 was not reassuring as we proceed towards talks on the limitation of arms and the easing of tensions in the Middle East. For the United States it may be well to realize that technology, trade,

nist state obsessed with the preservation of its own bank, apt bureaucracy. Each successive dependence upon force to coerce a dissenter or maintain one's own illegitimacy is a diminution of a great power's credibility and a threat to world peace and security. This is the real danger of Soviet foreign policy as reflected in the Hungarian and Czechoslovak crises.

FOOTNOTES

I—AN ANALYSIS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

1. Sir Winston L.S. Churchill, "The Second World War: the Gathering Storm (Bevin)" Houghton Mifflin, 1948, v. I, p. 149.
2. J. Malcolm Mackintosh, "Soviet Foreign Policy," *The World Today*, April 1968, p. 53.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
4. Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Concept of the Balance of Power in Soviet Policy-Making," *World Politics*, October 1951, p. 93.
5. *Ibid.*
6. Vernon V. Aspinwall, "Soviet Foreign Policy," Roy C. Macridis, ed., *Foreign Pol. Review* World Politics, 3d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 156.
7. *Ibid.*
8. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
9. Albin T. Anderson, "The Soviets and Northern Europe," *World Politics*, July 19, 1968, 463-487.
10. George Stambuk, "Yugoslavia," Vaclav Benes, et al., eds., *Eastern European Government and Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 194.
11. Nikita S. Khrushchev, quoted in S.L. Ploss, "The Uncertainties of Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, April 1963, p. 455.
12. William A. Glaser, "Theories of Soviet Foreign Policy: a Classification of the Literature," *World Affairs Quarterly*, July 1956, p. 120-152.
13. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961), p. 36.
14. Nikita S. Khrushchev, "The Moscow Conference of 1960," William G. Andrews, ed., *Soviet Institutions and Policies* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1966), p. 370.
15. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., *Nations in a Multipolar World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967).
21. 16. Vladimir I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966), v. XX, p. 477.
17. V. Sovtov, "Leninist Foreign Policy and International Relations," *International Affairs* (Moscow), April 1960, p. 339.
18. Lenin, quoted in Alfred E. Seiden, ed., *Readings in Russian Political and Diplomatic History* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1966), v. II, p. 38.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
20. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 5.
21. Louis J. Halle, "The Cracked Alliance," *The New Republic*, 23 February 1963, p. 1.
22. Churchill, p. 149.
23. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsarism (1890)," W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoschitz, eds., *The Russian Heritage to Europe* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), p. 27.
24. Andropov, p. 3.
25. Andrew Feigney, "Eastern Europe in Historic Perspective," *Years, et al., eds., p. 9.*
26. Vilmos Hidas, *On Aida Roads of Socialism* (Budapest: 1959), p. 12; Hidas reiterates his position in a 27 November 1961, *The New York Times* interview, p. 101, and in "Russia's Dangerous New Doctrine of Communism," *Readers Digest*, December 1966, p. 43-47.



United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary of State
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Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET

December 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman
National Intelligence Council
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: Richard T. McCormack *On My Honor*

SUBJECT: Your Memo: "Why Is the World So Dangerous"?

You can well imagine after our conversation that I find myself in large agreement with much of the picture that you present in this memorandum. It is an excellent piece.

I would caution you on your conclusion, however. To conclude from current favorable trends that the Soviets will attempt something as desperate as nuclear war as their only way to avoid prospective relative weakening and political disintegration does their analysts a disservice.

Soviet analysts know that trends in Washington last only as long as administrations. Our tougher bunch will at some point be replaced by a more starry-eyed crowd, and then the Russians may hope that the rot in the West will resume. New opportunities may arise as happened during the Carter Administration in Iran and Central America. The Defense budget may be slashed again. The economy may suffer a new wave of inflation and instability.

But I utterly agree with you that the Soviets will exploit opportunities as and when they arise to weaken the West. And in that context I say to you: Beware the Persian Gulf. There lies disaster for the West if we fail to contain the spreading hostilities between Iran and Iraq. There lies the possibility of major war in which we could progressively become embroiled. There lies the opportunity for the Soviets to provide weapons to local belligerents who would sink our ships and block our oil and so raise oil prices, abort our economic recovery and jeopardize both our debt strategy with the Third World, and our re-election prospects in the United States.

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